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Table of contents
Initial Aksbel table of contents. · Working · Nov 09, 2026 02:36 · saved by @mujirin
Table of contents
Mechanism Design
From strategic incentives to institutions that implement social goals
Read each section in order. Every title can be opened as a TheoryTrace document.
- Cover
- Copyright
- How to read this book
- Introduction
- Chapter 1: What Mechanism Design Tries to Solve
- Chapter 2: Game-Theoretic Foundations
- Chapter 3: Social Choice and Collective Decision Rules
- Chapter 4: Direct Mechanisms and the Revelation Principle
- Chapter 5: Incentive Compatibility and Individual Rationality
- Chapter 6: Efficiency, Transfers, and Quasilinear Preferences
- Chapter 7: Vickrey Auctions and Dominant Strategies
- Chapter 8: The VCG Mechanism
- Chapter 9: Limits of Efficient Mechanism Design
- Chapter 10: Bayesian Mechanism Design
- Chapter 11: Revenue Equivalence
- Chapter 12: Optimal Auctions and Virtual Values
- Chapter 13: Single-Parameter Mechanisms
- Chapter 14: Matching and Market Design
- Chapter 15: Implementation Theory
- Chapter 16: Moral Hazard and Contract Design
- Chapter 17: Information Design and Persuasion
- Chapter 18: Robustness, Complexity, and Practical Design
- Chapter 19: Applications: Auctions, Platforms, Public Policy, and Digital Markets
- Chapter 20: Designing and Evaluating a Mechanism
- Conclusion