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Table of contents

Initial Aksbel table of contents. · Working · Nov 09, 2026 02:36 · saved by @mujirin

Table of contents

Mechanism Design

From strategic incentives to institutions that implement social goals

Read each section in order. Every title can be opened as a TheoryTrace document.

  • Cover
  • Copyright
  • How to read this book
  • Introduction
  • Chapter 1: What Mechanism Design Tries to Solve
  • Chapter 2: Game-Theoretic Foundations
  • Chapter 3: Social Choice and Collective Decision Rules
  • Chapter 4: Direct Mechanisms and the Revelation Principle
  • Chapter 5: Incentive Compatibility and Individual Rationality
  • Chapter 6: Efficiency, Transfers, and Quasilinear Preferences
  • Chapter 7: Vickrey Auctions and Dominant Strategies
  • Chapter 8: The VCG Mechanism
  • Chapter 9: Limits of Efficient Mechanism Design
  • Chapter 10: Bayesian Mechanism Design
  • Chapter 11: Revenue Equivalence
  • Chapter 12: Optimal Auctions and Virtual Values
  • Chapter 13: Single-Parameter Mechanisms
  • Chapter 14: Matching and Market Design
  • Chapter 15: Implementation Theory
  • Chapter 16: Moral Hazard and Contract Design
  • Chapter 17: Information Design and Persuasion
  • Chapter 18: Robustness, Complexity, and Practical Design
  • Chapter 19: Applications: Auctions, Platforms, Public Policy, and Digital Markets
  • Chapter 20: Designing and Evaluating a Mechanism
  • Conclusion
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