Log in
Without logging in, you can read through the introduction, including the cover, copyright page, reading guide, and table of contents. Log in or create an account to continue to the chapters.
Log in
Table of contents
Mechanism Design
From strategic incentives to institutions that implement social goals
Read each section in order. Every title can be opened as a TheoryTrace document.
- Cover1
- Copyright2
- How to read this book3
- Introduction4
- Chapter 1: What Mechanism Design Tries to Solve5
- Chapter 2: Game-Theoretic Foundations6
- Chapter 3: Social Choice and Collective Decision Rules7
- Chapter 4: Direct Mechanisms and the Revelation Principle8
- Chapter 5: Incentive Compatibility and Individual Rationality9
- Chapter 6: Efficiency, Transfers, and Quasilinear Preferences10
- Chapter 7: Vickrey Auctions and Dominant Strategies11
- Chapter 8: The VCG Mechanism12
- Chapter 9: Limits of Efficient Mechanism Design13
- Chapter 10: Bayesian Mechanism Design14
- Chapter 11: Revenue Equivalence15
- Chapter 12: Optimal Auctions and Virtual Values16
- Chapter 13: Single-Parameter Mechanisms17
- Chapter 14: Matching and Market Design18
- Chapter 15: Implementation Theory19
- Chapter 16: Moral Hazard and Contract Design20
- Chapter 17: Information Design and Persuasion21
- Chapter 18: Robustness, Complexity, and Practical Design22
- Chapter 19: Applications: Auctions, Platforms, Public Policy, and Digital Markets23
- Chapter 20: Designing and Evaluating a Mechanism24
- Conclusion25